worthy of mention. John Alvis comes at the play from the republican angle of Machiavelli' s commentary on Livy, wanting to know why Hamlet can't dispose of the tyrant cleanly. To Alvis' s chagrin, the answer is that Hamlet is disabled by his original-sin fixation. 12 Finally, Vladimir Brljak reads Hamlet' s excuse to Laertes in Act 5 for killing Polonius ("That I have shot mine arrow o' er the house / And hurt my brother" [Q2 5.2.190-91] ) as a reference to a late medieval legend derived from an obscure utterance in Genesis 4 by Lamech (an impious descendant of Cain whose inadvertent killing of Cain brings God' s curse upon him). 13 Again, the consequence for Hamlet-whose traditional name "Amleth" is an anagram of "Lameth," a common form of "Lamech"-is a leveling of moral distinction. Of all these original-sin-focused studies, only Belsey' s is not a leveling reading.
To my mind, the presence of original sin in the play provokes more fundamental questions than have been asked so far. Why, given the associated problem of "tragic balance", is it present at all? Where does the theme come from? Is original sin a mental illness or an ideology? Must it be understood primarily in a mythic-symbolic register or a doctrinal one? One of my suggestions will be that while the narrative in Genesis is a given, its interpretation is not, and particularly not during the Reformation. This prompts another question about the play: to what extent is this doctrinal element of the radically reformed kind? And if it is, then what are its aesthetic consequences? Does original sin mandate a leveling reading? In what follows, I address these questions via four related propositions.
First, I point to the intuitiveness of original sin in the sense of radical doubt of human goodness as distinct from a doctrine in its early modern context. The idea has classical, as well as scriptural, contexts. However deranging it might be for the holder, such radical doubt is neither irrational nor even necessarily religious. That is, it has a conceptual shape, religious and philosophical forms of which are present in two Shakespeare plays closely contemporary with Hamlet.
Second, I insist on the sheer deliberateness of the theme, which is no part of the plot' s surviving sources (Saxo Grammaticus and Belleforest) but is introduced entirely at Shakespeare' s discretion.
14 This might seem a superfluous claim to make, but my point is to demonstrate full Shakespearean ownership. Existing criticism has a tendency to treat original sin as an emblematic monad that somehow takes over the meaning of the play. This said, however, the theme does betray an extra-Shakespearean origin comprising not just the narrative of Genesis 3 and 4 but the Reformed theological commentary upon that narrative.
Third, I argue that the theme is fully absorbed into the aesthetic DNA of imagery, language, and character. The whole personal and interpersonal world said to be under sin in the play is imagined with a depth and mystery without precedent in Shakespeare. It is not just the character of Hamlet that is affected, but Claudius, Gertrude, and the whole society that Michael Long refers to as "Elsinore,"
15 right down to the seedy occupants of Hamlet' s graveyard, those word-twisting avatars of "Cain' s jawbone" (F 5.1.77). Here, I contend that the distinctiveness of the language in Hamlet owes quite as much to the original-sin theme as it does to revenge.
Fourth, I turn to Hamlet' s persistent intuition of original sin and his struggle with the politics of conscience. 16 Given that Hamlet is hobbled by religious doubt, in Kierkegaard' s sense, can he kill Claudius without corrupting himself? Hamlet' s attempt to conscript conscience to revenge is certainly ambiguous and possibly futile, leading to a conclusion heavy with religious doubt, but touched equally by the promise of salvation.
I
It is important to register the intellectual intuitiveness of original sin in late Elizabethan England. That the timber of humanity is crooked-the heart desperately wicked-is never in need of demonstration. Luther observes that scripture "calls this viciousness by the name most proper to it . . . iniquity, depravity or crookedness." 17 For Calvin, it is obvious that "there is no sounde or whole parte in us . . . that our minde is stricken with blindnesse . . . that all the affections of our heart are full of rebellion and wickedness"; "man' s heart is . . . inclosed with . . . lurking corners and by-turninges."
18 When the religious tone is subtracted, moral doubt remains. Virtue is not the full story of success: one flourishes because of one' s cunning, not despite it or because of the ability to disguise one' s own intentions while second-guessing those of others. Bacon warns against suspicion not because it is unwarranted ("What would men have? Do they think those they employ and deal with are saints? Do they not think, they will have their own ends, and be truer to themselves, than to them?") but because it is more likely to derange us than serve our interest ("Therefore there is no better way, to moderate suspicions, than to account upon such suspicions as true, and yet to bridle them as false"). 19 One reason for the intuitiveness of original sin in the early modern period is that self-interest had yet to be categorized-as it would be by Shaftesbury in 1699-as a naturally occurring human endowment, an ontological predisposition without moral meaning as such.
20
This bicameral view of self-knowledge implicit in Of Suspicion was explicitly held by the Reformers. For Calvin, a man "seems to know himself very well when, confident in his understanding and uprightness, he becomes bold and urges himself to the duties of virtue, and, declaring war on vices, endeavors to exert himself with all his ardor towards the excellent and the honorable." 21 From this piano nobile level of the self, good deeds proceed, which is why the Reformers held them to be spiritually insignificant. At a lower level, that of "the ground of the heart," a man "finds nothing to lift his heart to self-confidence."
22 He finds instead "Hydra, a many-headed and most tenacious monster, with which we struggle in the Lernean swamp of this life till the very day of our death." 23 The bicameral model of the self is not exclusive to the Reformers. In a passage of the Phaedrus that is cited by both Joseph de Maistre and Søren Kierkegaard as evidence that the ancients knew about original sin, Socrates entertains a philosophical version of religious doubt: "I can't as yet 'know myself ' . . . [or] discover whether I really am a more complex creature and more puffed up with pride than Typhon, or a simpler, gentler being whom heaven has blessed with a quiet, un-Typhonic nature." Like Hydra, Typhon is a serpentine monster. Such symbolism is recapitulated in Reformed art in figures such as Spenser' s "Error," the many-headed beast bestridden by the Whore of Babylon in Revelation, or the "Hydra-headed wilfulness" of Henry V (1.1.36). A version of serpentine dualism is also behind Plato' s antiparable of Gyges in book 2 of The Republic. 25 In contrast to the final paean to justice in book 1, book 2 begins with a scandalously minimalistic account. As Glaucon argues, "Justice, they tell us . . . is accepted and approved, not as a real good, but as a thing honored in the lack of vigor to do injustice."
26 Justice exists only because human beings are less confident of prevailing unjustly than they are afraid of the injustice of others. Fear aside, injustice is the default setting of the human psyche even in the just man: "If we grant to both the just and the unjust license and power to do whatever they please, and then accompany them in imagination. . . . We should then catch the just man in the very act of resorting to the same conduct as the unjust man because of the self-advantage which every creature by its nature pursues as a good." 27 The parable of Gyges and the magic ring follows. Upon discovering a ring that makes him invisible, Gyges, a humble Lydian shepherd, infiltrated the king' s palace, "seduced the king' s wife and with her aid set upon the king and slew him and possessed his kingdom."
28
Whether he was directly or indirectly 29 familiar with this parable, Shakespeare descants on its inherent moral skepticism. Thus, hearing that his father has been declared a "traitor," young Macduff inquires into the definition of a traitor and decides that society is packed with them (Macbeth, 4.2.45-60). The parable is equally suggestive of Hamlet, both for Claudius (a previously inconspicuous man whose road to success closely resembles that of Gyges) and for Hamlet himself, the just man who restrains his inner violence only because of a watchful conscience that "does make cowards of us all" (F 3.1.83).
Profound moral doubt seems to me the doorway through which the idea of original sin enters Hamlet. Seeing himself in the mirror of Gertrude whose marriage to Claudius shocks him with its hint of inner monstrosity, Q2' s Hamlet is stricken by disgust at his own "sallied" flesh (Q2 1.2.129). Similar THE QUESTION OF ORIGINAL SIN IN HAMLET 401 moral pessimism, along with an explicit theme of self-contradiction, is also at the heart of other contemporary plays. Although its idiom is entirely classical, Troilus and Cressida asks a version of the skeptical question posed by original sin. In a scene strongly reminiscent of Hamlet, Ulysses is discovered reading a book on the theme that identity is a mere artifact. Self-knowledge is no more than an accurate sense of what others think of us:
Nor doth the eye itself, That most pure spirit of sense, behold itself, Not going from itself; but eye to eye opposed Salutes each other with each other' s form. For speculation turns not to itself Till it hath travelled and is mirrored there Where it may see itself.
(Troilus and Cressida, 3.3. [100] [101] [102] [103] [104] [105] [106] While this approach to the question of the bicameral self is from the upper chamber, rather than the Lutheran "ground of the heart," the conclusion is still devastating. Self-knowledge is limited to the little part of us that others behold. The self is fatally beholden to a given peer group or social world. Cressida breaks her deepest vows as soon as she finds herself in a social world with different claims on her. Hector abandons what he rightly takes to be the true course-returning Helen to the Greeks-simply to bask in the approval of his own heroic cult. With the mirrors of esteem clouded, Achilles finds no selfimage at all: "My mind is troubled like a fountain stirred, / And I myself see not the bottom of it" (ll. 298-99).
Transposed to the Christian idiom of Measure for Measure, the mirror metaphor of Troilus and its ontological skepticism are restated in a theological key: The identity or "essence" of the magistrate, argues Isabella, is "glassy" in two senses: in retorting a vacuous social esteem, and in the intoxicating effects of that esteem. (Here, Angelo is the ape driven mad by its own reflection in a mirror.) In keeping with the Christian character of this play, the mirror metaphor is framed in terms of original sin: we are all wrong in the core of our being, Isabella reminds Angelo (ll. [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] , and earthly judges do well to bear that in mind. The ape and its mirror (speculum) are a cosmic spectacle or theater. The ontological skepticism of the theatrum mundi helps explain why it was one of Calvin' s favorite commonplaces. 30 
II
My second proposition concerns the centrality of original sin in Hamlet, its deliberateness, its patently Reformed quality, and its origins in Reformed commentary on Genesis. The symbolism of original sin is global in a still-unacknowledged way. It saturates the motif of hidden corruption so well described by Carolyn Spurgeon:
To Shakespeare' s pictorial imagination . . . the problem in Hamlet is not predominantly that of will and reason, of a mind too philosophic or a nature temperamentally unfitted; he sees it pictorially not as the problem of an individual at all, but as something greater and even more mysterious, as a condition for which the individual himself is apparently not responsible, any more than the sick man is to blame for the infection which strikes and devours him, but which, nevertheless . . . impartially and relentlessly, annihilates him and others innocent and guilty alike. That is the tragedy of Hamlet, as it is perhaps the chief tragic mystery of life. , and what-in F only-Hamlet describes as "this canker of our nature" (F 5.2.69). Spurgeon finds this theme so potent that she suggests, "When the play opens Hamlet has already begun to die, to die internally . . . infected by the disease of the spirit which is-unknown to him-killing him." 33 Her intuition here is close to the idea of modern (as distinct from ancient) tragedy that Kierkegaard entertains in the theorem of a modern Antigone, whose "life is . . . essentially over" at the start of her play: "Her life does not unfold like the Greek Antigone; it is not turned outward but inward." 34 Unlike the tragedy of the Greek Antigone, which consists of the acting out of her defiance, that of Kierkegaard' s modern Antigone is the reflective "anxiety" that she brings to her play. Kierkegaard While the imagery of original sin is global as I have just discussed it above, that same imagery in Hamlet can strike us as incongruous, as savoring too strongly of Reformed theology. Consider Polonius' s instruction to Reynaldo to spread rumors of Laertes' s wildness. Reynaldo must not impute positive "dishonor" to Laertes (F 2.1.27), but merely hint at the taints of liberty, The flash and outbreak of a fiery mind, A savageness in unreclaimed blood, Of general assault.
(F 2.1.32-35)
Reynaldo must suggest "wanton, wild, and usual slips" (F2.1.22) which should not be "so rank / As may dishonour him" (F 2.1.20-21). The words "slips" and "rank" link this imagery with the "unweeded garden / That grows to seed," the postlapsarian garden possessed of "things rank and gross in nature" (F 1.2.133-34).
39
There is a curiously insistent theological quality to Polonius' s words; this savage 404 SHAKESPEARE QUARTERLY 35 Kierkegaard, "Ancient Tragedy' s Reflection," 153. blood is "unreclaimed." As there is no possibility that Laertes is unbaptized, this can only mean that he is not redeemed from sin, that he is not of the elect (unlike, presumably, Polonius himself ). Fortinbras is similarly described as someone "Of unimproved mettle, hot and full" (F 1.1.95). "Unimproved," according to G. R. Hibbard, is a Shakespeare coinage meaning "untried."
40 Yet in conjunction with the associated picture of gross rebellion-Fortinbras "hath in the skirts of Norway, here and there, / Sharked up a list of landless resolutes" (F 1.1.96-97)-the coinage takes on a Reformed tint, of the old Adam rather than the new man.
Such incongruities might remind us that original sin is no part of the traditional Hamlet narrative in either Saxo Grammaticus or Belleforest. Like the episode of Lucius Junius Brutus in Livy that it loosely resembles, the Amleth story is all about decisive action. 41 There is no hint of Kierkegaard' s religious doubt in Amleth or Brutus; Shakespeare introduces it against the grain of the material. In the sources, madness is necessary to protect Amleth from the raw violence of his adversary Fengo. In Shakespeare, a disguise is not strictly necessary because Claudius is not openly violent and poses no immediate danger, hence the very different character of madness in Hamlet as a window into the hero' s theological demoralization. The distance between source and play is too manifold to be shown here, but it can be suggested by what Shakespeare makes of a single narrative detail. In the sources, the Ophelia figure is sent by Fengo as bait to entice Amleth' s secret, but from either friendship or love she remains loyal. In Shakespeare, Ophelia loves Hamlet but sides with her father' s attempt to spy on him.
What Shakespeare principally makes of this narrative cue is the nunnery scene (F 3.1), the clearest instance of the play' s original-sin theme and a scene in which the theme' s doctrinal focus is distinct from the narrative-symbolic. More than anywhere else in Hamlet, we sense the theme in its strongly Reformed character. Consider a line such as "virtue cannot so inoculate our old stock but we shall relish of it" (F 3.1.117-19). Only in Lutheran and Calvinist doctrine is virtue no part whatever of our natural competence. Moral strength is ours at all only by divine imputation. It is ours in a secondary sense through the Atonement rather than in the primary sense of natural law. Virtue is grafted to our nature, as in the gardening metaphor of the word "inoculate." Yet the "old stock," the warped natural root, persists regardless of how well the grafting takes. Although brilliantly assimilated to the aesthetic structure, the doctrinal element visibly imprints itself upon the scene. The imagery derives from Romans 11:16-20, which explains the grafting of the Gentiles to the elect stock of Abraham. Hamlet' s remark echoes both the spirit and letter of Calvin' s commentary to this passage-"For the original of the Gentiles was (as it were) of a wilde and barren olive: because they found nothing in their whole petegrie but malediction. Therefore whatsoever glorie they have, that is of the newe grafting and not of the olde stocke."
43 While for Calvin, the "horror, weariness, anxietie, and desperation" arising from contemplating "the miserable condition of our nature"
44 ("the olde stocke") leads us toward God, for Hamlet it takes us nowhere. Hamlet' s tone is hardly pious. The word "relish" seems to twist a Calvinist metaphor of taste. In Thomas Norton' s Elizabethan translation of the Institutes, we read that the newly faithful will develop a "taste" for higher things: "And so man' s understanding . . . doth never till then truely begin to tast of those thinges that belong to the kingdome of God, being before altogether unsavourie and without iudgement of tast to take assay of them." 45 For Calvin, the taste of the elect is proactive rather than retroactive: it is literally in bad taste for the elect to compulsively savor their root condition (as Hamlet does). The verbal tease continues; Hamlet vows to kill Claudius in an act "that has no relish of salvation in't" (Q2 3.4.92). Here, the verbal echo underlines an uncomfortably Calvinist continuity between hero and villain: the virtuous man who relishes the "old stock" and the reprobate who providentially dies in an act relishing of salvation.
These two dimensions of the original-sin theme-the symbolism derived from the Fall narrative in Genesis 3 and 4, and the doctrine of totalized taint echoed by Hamlet in the nunnery scene-are powerfully fused in Luther Traditional Genesis commentary was largely typological, a strategy driven in part by the church fathers' embarrassment in the face of the glaringly unChristian character of the Old Testament corpus.
47 But Luther and Calvin, far from being embarrassed by the Old Testament, took it as an invitation to dramatize themes of faith, election, predestination, and reprobation with a vividness lacking in their New Testament commentaries. In its very understatement, the Old Testament offered opportunities for imaginative surmise or proactive reading that the New Testament did not. Undergirding Reformed enthusiasm for the Old Testament was a conviction that it was in essence a Christian document to which the radical propositions of Reformed theology could apply with a freedom and intensity not permitted by the New Testament. Of Luther, Heinrich Bornkamm observes, "The incessant translation of Old Testament ideas into the Christian thought world-as into a foreign language-involves not so much a shift in concepts which can be precisely specified as a change in atmosphere which often can only be sensed. Such translation is not a matter of conscious and intentional change, but rather a natural process of recasting, which involves every part. . . . When Luther interpreted and translated the Old Testament he injected the gospel into its bloodstream so that it spread into the smallest capillaries almost by itself." 48 Calvin too saw the two testaments as essentially one, systematically reading the Old through the New: "Thus the two Covenants become one, the two Churches one, the two sets of writings, one book." 49 Where the Old Testament had been read as explicitly opposing the New-a covenant of the law versus a covenant of grace-the Reformers saw the Old Testament as a covenant of grace, with its true exemplars accessing grace by spiritual intuition. Only its false exemplars epitomized the law. The Reformers detected a prototype of the Reformed church as far back as the primitive congregation of Adam, Eve, and Seth. The majority church of the Old Testament was a church of the law, which means a church of pharisaical legal observance. Both Reformers bring this new immediacy to their readings of Genesis 3 and 4. It is no exaggeration to say that they treat the main figures of Adam, Eve, and Cain in the way that Jan Kott treats Shakespeare' s characters, as "contemporaries," which is to say, as exemplars of Reformed theological psychology. 50 Two key notions bridge the gap between the "there-ness" of Genesis and the "here-ness" of early modernity: faith and hypocrisy. The two terms are defined reciprocally: hypocrisy is everything human that resists the radical demand of faith. Adam, Eve, and Cain are hypocrites of a type that the Reformers know intimately from their everyday experience. As a social vice, hypocrisy would seem to be out of place in Eden. But the first couple are hypocritical in the existential (and for Calvin, primary) sense of refusing to know themselves before God. Thus, Calvin reads the fig leaves as a squeamish evasion: Adam and Eve "were led to repentaunce, neither with true shame, nor with serious feare . . . the feeling of their evill was onely confused, and ioyned with dullnesse, much like unto a dreame in unquiet sleepe."
51 Yet we should not be too quick to judge them, Calvin says, because "we all are sicke of the same disease: for even at the first pricke of conscience, we tremble, are ashamed: by and by there creepeth in a favourable iudgement of our selves, which leaveth us to vaine toyes."
52
Calvin and Luther see hypocrisy less as a particular vice than as a way of being-ordinary and monstrous at the same time. So (following Calvin) does Du Bartas. The following passage on the ingrained moral evasiveness of the intellect is taken from a reflective chapter on the contemporary human meaning of the Fall titled "The Furies," which is sandwiched between two narrative chapters recounting Genesis 3 and 4:
But, for these Ills raigne in our intellect (Which onlie, them both can and ought detect) They rest unknown; or rather selfe-concealed; And soule-sicke Patients care not to be healed . . . Whereas our fond self-soothing Soule, thus sick, Rubs her owne soare; with glozing Rhetorike Cloaking her vice: and makes the blinded blaine. 54 Judith Shklar invokes the same adjective in her notion of "ordinary vices," namely, "the sort of conduct we all expect, nothing spectacular, nothing unusual."
55 Such vices-"cruelty, hypocrisy, snobbery, treachery, misanthropy"-do not correspond with "the seven deadly sins of traditional Christianity."
56
A distinction is to be drawn between Luther and Calvin in respect of the ordinary. Luther saw the split between the Adamite group and the Cainite group in terms of the two churches, Reformed and Roman. The Cainites were the hypocrites, while the Adamites were Reformed. Calvin preferred to follow St. Augustine in viewing the Cainites as the founders of the "city of the world," which is to say, political economy or, in Carl Schmitt' s view, politics per se. 57 Of the two approaches, that of Augustine and Calvin is the more "modern." In the words of Patrick Downey, "Cain founds the first city. . . . Politics is revealed for what it is, a pack of hidden murderers and thieves who appear to be law-abiding citizens out of fear rather than desire. Inside the heart of every citizen is a fugitive and wanderer who has no place to lay his head because he has exiled himself from his fellow man and creation. Outside, that same fugitive is a solid citizen who farms, plays well with others and obeys the law."
58 This kind of thought underlies Hamlet.
III
My third proposition is that the insistently Reformed language of original sin is transformed in the course of its aesthetic assimilation to character. Shakespeare' s version of Calvin' s "hypocrite" is Claudius, but there is an "ordinary woman," too. Gertrude is a remarkably delicate blend of "ordinary" pathos and utter inscrutability. Her response to the accusation implicit in the Player Queen' s vows of undying love-"The lady protests too much, methinks" (F 3.2.222)-is superbly evasive. In her elusiveness and fundamental impenetrability, Gertrude speaks to the Pravum est cor omnium et inscrutabile in Jerome 17:9 of the Vulgate ("The heart is more deceitful than every other thing, and it is malicious"). 59 At the same time, she raises the modern and entirely normal problem of "other minds." A comparison of Q1, Q2, and F is instructive. In Q1, this elusiveness is missing. The queen is a known quantity. On being clearly informed in the closet scene that her former husband has been murdered, she protests, "I never knew of this most horrid murder" (Q1 11.86). Afterward, she consistently sides with Hamlet against Claudius. Evidently, Q1' s redactor was unable to tolerate a constitutive ambiguity in so important a character; the queen must declare herself for one side or the other.
In contrast, Gertrude is always a question mark in Q2 and F. She does not clearly acknowledge Hamlet' s allegation of murder, condemn Claudius, or side with Hamlet against Claudius. On the other hand, she is not entirely of Claudius' s party. She sits on the fence and stays there right up until the moment of her death. The question of her constitutive ambiguity ought to turn on the question of what she does or does not know about the murder. Hamlet' s slightly muddled allegation, "As kill a king and marry with his brother" (Q2 3.4.27), which makes it sound as if Gertrude was the murderer, is found nearly identically in all three texts. But only in Q1 does the allegation force Gertrude to declare herself.
In psychological terms, it seems as if Gertrude' s heart is not "made of penetrable stuff " (Q2 3.4.34), if being penetrated by an imputation implies that the accuser has a true picture of the mind or conscience being penetrated. The difference is between being confident that one can know another mind and admitting that one cannot. Q1 takes the first of these positions, while Q2 and F take the second. When Q1 Hamlet says, "I'll make your eyes look down into your heart / And see how horrid there and black it shows" (11.21-22), he implies that he has access to what is in Gertrude' s heart. He knows what color her heart is and why. But in Q2 and F, he has no such access. Q1' s imagery of blackness and taint is expressed by Gertrude, who sees "black and grained spots" (F 3.4.81) or "black and grieved spots" (Q2 3.4.87-88) in her soul and guards the secret of what they are and how they got there. So innovative and tactful a character sketch would seem at odds with the homiletic idiom of sin and hypocrisy. However, Hamlet hangs the sign of "Frailty" around Gertrude' s neck in all three texts, perhaps echoing the Eve of Sylvester' s Du Bartas, the "fraile treacherous bride", with her "frail brest" and her "simple frailty." 60 Gertrude is actually more Eve-like in Q2 and F because these texts foreground the issue of concupiscence and sideline her complicity in murder. Gertrude' s "black and grained spots" speak the language of sin, not crime-the primal sin of Eve.
For all this, it is mainly in her son' s language that we sense an overtly homiletic tone of pious horror. Hamlet' s hysterical reaction to Gertrude (and to Ophelia in the nunnery scene) is typical of the Reformation' s anxiety about sin, as distinct from the Reformation theology of sin seen in the commentaries on Genesis. It is the tone of spiritual crisis in Puritan autobiography, a burgeoning consciousness of sin coupled with a despair of salvation. The play itself does not recoil from Gertrude or condemn the love between Gertrude and Claudius. Shakespeare wishes us to register Hamlet' s account in the closet scene as both hysterical and reductive (in the manner of Iago' s account of love as "merely a lust of the blood and a permission of the will" [Othello, 1.3.333]). The problem here is not exclusively with Hamlet so much as with the difficulty posed by an ethical perspective on original sin. Ethics, as Kierkegaard notes in a brilliant aperçu, is driven to hysteria by original sin: "As soon as sin is actually posited, ethics is immediately on the spot, and now ethics follows every move sin makes." 61 Understanding is not the strong suit of ethics because "ethics is never observing but always accusing, judging and acting." 62 This results in formulations such as the Smalcaldic article, 63 describing "hereditary sin" as "so profound and detestable a corruption in human nature that it cannot be comprehended by human understanding, but must be known and believed from the revelation of the Scriptures." 64 The statement is confused, insists Kierkegaard, for assuming "the role of an accuser, who with an almost feminine passion . . . is now concerned only with making sinfulness and his own participation in it more and more detestable, in such a manner that no word can be severe enough to describe the single individual' s participation in it." 65 This is an apt comment on Hamlet' s tone in the closet and nunnery scenes, in both of which (ironically) he is more often taxed with misogyny than with hysteria.
In Gertrude, Shakespeare has taken the radically normalized category of hypocrisy in the Reformers seriously as a premise of characterization. By normalizing the agents of Genesis, the Reformers-especially Calvin-wanted to THE 
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shock their readers into acknowledging the primal fallibility of normal lives. Du Bartas follows Calvin' s lead closely in "The Furies" when reflecting on the fallen condition of ordinary humanity. Shakespeare too follows this Calvinist logic, but with a brilliant twist: building his characters on an assumption of normal crookedness, he suspends judgment while inviting complicity. If Gertrude and Claudius are judged at all, it is only by their fellow hypocrites, the audience.
Claudius is Shakespeare' s version of Cain, or Calvin' s "ordinary man." He is a conscientious and sympathetic villain, unusual in a genre specializing in unconscionable Machiavels. He will do what is necessary to become king, and then do what is necessary to stay king. But far from gloating, he is tortured by wrong once he has done it. Two aspects of Calvin' s portrait of Cain are suggestive of Claudius-hypocrisy and conscience. That Cain should be explained in terms of the same moral psychology as Adam and Eve is a striking feature of Reformed commentary in both Calvin and Luther. There is no sharp line between the murderer and the merely fallen, the former being an exacerbation of the latter. Cain' s evil only seems to begin with his murderous jealousy of Abel; it has begun already in the "uncleannesse of his heart." 66 Cain is a version of the Eve paradox, where primal wickedness is commonplace: "In the person of Caine we have an image of a wicked man painted forth unto us, who notwithstanding his wickednesse will be counted iust"; such men "would be at peace with God after their owne will." 67 Cain pays lip service to God, but does not "yeelde and bende him selfe wholly unto him."
68 Hypocrisy comes from knowing oneself before men, rather than before God. To all intents, it is the ethical signature of original sin, a perpetual veto of the natural law originally inscribed in the human heart. Calvin wants his portrait of Cain to shock; the reader must feel her existential continuity with the first murderer. She is a potential murderer, as it were, by being a real hypocrite.
Hypocrisy, in all of these senses, is Claudius' s keynote. It is not just that he is more fox than lion or may "smile and smile and be a villain" (F 1.5.108). To judge him from the outside is something that the play (as distinct from Hamlet) never does. Claudius is less a villain than a slider between moral and emotional claims, a finder-out of mirth in funeral and delight in dole. He emerges indirectly in a multitude of details, large and small. We can begin with a small (and traditionally puzzling) detail found only in Q2 and F-the care Claudius lavishes on his description (F 4.3.67-76) of the horsemanship of Lamord (as he is called in 412 SHAKESPEARE QUARTERLY 66 Commentarie of John Calvine, 141. Compare the moment of the sacrifice in Du Bartas, where Abel, "with zealous cry / Cleaves bright Olympus starrie Canopie," Cain, "with fained lips . . . lowd-resounded / Hart-wanting hymnes, on selfe-deseruing founded" (ll. . 67 Commentarie of John Calvine, 132. 68 Commentarie of John Calvine, 131. Q2), the Norman who praised Laertes' s skill with the rapier. Why should this detail be drawn out at such length? Philip Edwards suggests that Claudius' s love of horsemanship parallels Hamlet' s love of the theater. 69 Michael Long explains it as a brief moment of Philistine escapism, indulged in by both men, from the troubling business of murder. 70 These attractive hypotheses become more substantial if the passage is taken as echoing Du Bartas' s topos of Cain' s horse. A long passage in "The Handicrafts" describes Cain' s taming of a beautiful horse. In part, Cain wishes to escape vengeance for the murder of Abel; he also wants to distract himself from the agonies of a bad conscience. 71 Shakespeare comes closest to echoing Du Bartas in the detail where Lamord grew into his seat And to such wondrous doing brought his horse As had he been incorpsed and demi-natured With the brave beast.
(F 4.3.71- 74) In Du Bartas, Cain is said to have "so done with time-grace-ordred skill, / As both had but one bodie and one will." 72 What is most interesting about this resonance is the moral status of horsemanship in Du Bartas. Mastery of the horse is bad when serving a bad conscience and a bad cause (the horse serves for conquest, as well as flight); yet it is good as a necessary and entirely normal aspect of man' s conquest of nature. Simon Goulart, the Genevan Calvinist minister whose notes to Du Bartas still form the backbone of learned commentary, addresses this ambiguity in his discussion of the line "Cain, as they say, by this deep feare disturbed": "The poet intending to shew that Cain and his race were a people addicted to the world (who had no thought but of the commodities of the earth) by a gentle invention, attributed to Cain, a man stout and strong, a man that had opportunity and leisure, seeking after nought else, but that which might give him a truce to the warre, which was within his evill conscience, endevored himself to back & tame Horses, this exercise being truly proper to dispost men, hardy and strong in hand, and whose hearts were thorowly settled on this world."
73 Acknowledging that horsemanship is undeniably a good, Goulart goes on to allow, "If those that have holy thoughts, addict themselves to master such generous beasts . . . it is for necessity, and when as pleasure is united thereunto . . . yet so as they have that thing always in their memory, which is the princi-THE QUESTION OF ORIGINAL SIN IN HAMLET 413 pal." 74 A sidelight is thrown on this ambiguity in a 1618 sermon by Samuel Ward that likens a good sermon to a good horse, one more effective than elegant: "You shall sometimes see an excellent horse of shape and colour, having many of those markes Du Bartas describes in Caine' s supposed horse; which yet wanting mettle hath beene of little worth and lesse use." 75 In other words, the topos is as morally ambiguous in Du Bartas as it is in Hamlet: talking about sports is an innocent diversion for Claudius and Laertes and a salve to the evil scheme they are hatching. Nothing could be more normal for aristocrats such as Claudius and Laertes than a love of fine horsemanship. But as the vaguely sinister name "Lamord" suggests, the normality is ominous: the two men (who have been circling each other warily up to this point) connect through this shared taste and seal their alliance.
A second and weightier example of Claudius' s bad normality is his failure to stop Gertrude' s drinking from the poisoned cup. As far as Claudius is concerned, Gertrude is not expendable. But Claudius is incapable of seizing the one moment that he has to dash the cup from Gertrude' s hands because that would mean exposure. The pain and confusion, the shame and futility of this moment are richly understated. We have but to fill in the dots, much as Luther says of the gnomic verbal form of Genesis 4 when Cain "rose up" against Abel: "Among historical accounts there is one about a painter who painted the story of Iphigenia at the moment she was about to be sacrificed. To each of the spectators he assigned his own particular demeanour, expressive of his sorrow or grief. But the head of the father, who was present at the scene, he covered up, because he held that the depth of the father' s feeling could not be expressed in a painting." 76 The father of course is Agamemnon, and his emotion is beyond depiction because it is so deeply agonized. Luther goes on to say that "Moses really did the same thing . . . he suggests by dots, as it were, situations that cannot be expressed in words." 77 One of Luther' s great strengths as a commentator on the Old Testament compared to Calvin is the aesthetic intelligence of his use of tragedy as a paratext. That Cain is a hypocrite does not mean that he is less than fully human or less an object of human sympathy. As for Moses, Luther attributes his succinctness partly to artistic tact and partly to depth of feeling: there were moments in which Moses literally could not see the page for weeping. 78 
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The second feature linking Claudius to Calvin' s Cain is his conscience. For Calvin, conscience is the psychological and spiritual complement to hypocrisy. Because of its inaccessibility, its capacity to hide in the law, hypocrisy always outstrips human sanction. Conscience alone can track the hypocrite through all the "lurking corners and by turninges" of his heart. 79 Typically, the hypocrite resists his conscience but for this very reason, he will be "feered and tormented with secret burning yrons." 80 The pain of conscience, Calvin tells us, is a foretaste of the final judgment, the only way that hypocrisy is punished in this world. "Conscience" is a keyword for Hamlet as much as it is for Claudius, but only Claudius has a truly Calvinistic dread of it. Hamlet (as we shall see) disputes "cases of conscience" where conscience might point two ways, 81 while Claudius fears conscience as the infallible register of his depravity. "How smart a lash that speech doth give my conscience!" (F 3.1.50), Claudius says of a Polonius commonplace about hypocrisy. In the prayer scene (Q2 3.3.36-72), Claudius is excoriated by his conscience because he is incapable of repenting of the sins with which his conscience upbraids him. Calvin, I think, would have found nothing to complain of in this speech, perhaps not even the empathy that Claudius' s ordeal arouses in the audience. Before God, the murderer' s plight is a version of our own. Of course, Claudius never lets conscience bar his way to new crime. When Laertes boasts that he will "cut" Hamlet' s "throat i'th' church" (F 4.3.99), Claudius answers, "No place indeed should murder sanctuarize. / Revenge should have no bounds" (F 4.3.100-101). What starts out as a case of conscience (if it is sacrilegious to take revenge in the church, is it legitimate to take it somewhere else?) ends in a brilliantly cynical conceit.
Elsinore is full of ordinary men and women. Reading this society through Schopenhauer' s sin-soaked idea of tragedy, Michael Long characterizes it as "philistine," in the sense of willing a low moral horizon upon itself.
82 "Ordinary" suits Elsinore better, as a concept truer to Schopenhauer and closer to original sin in the Reformed theological key. "Ordinary" is more akin to the twenty-first century than the later twentieth, when "philistinism" seemed a remediable vice, something that could be fixed by moral earnestness and education. 83 We have already considered four Elsinoreans. It is worth briefly considering several more: Polonius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, and the fictional occu- pants of Elsinore' s graveyard, the avatars of "Cain' s jawbone" (F 5.1.77). Polonius has been a troubling figure for critics since the 1930s. For anti-Hamlet critic Eleanor Prosser, he is a harmless dotard, whose killing is very much to Hamlet' s discredit. 84 For Jan Kott, he is head of the secret police, and his death is positively welcome. 85 If we consider Polonius ordinary, we can decide between these positions because the moral ambiguity is inbuilt. Deviousness may be second nature to Polonius, but he is capable of reproving himself for this fault and paining Claudius with his simple honesty (F 3.1.46-49). He is capable, too, of that famously pious admonition to a son (F 1.3.55-81). We can almost imagine Plato referring to this speech in the Gyges section of The Republic when he remarks on the bad faith of the genre of paternal advice: "Fathers, when they address exhortations to their sons . . . urge the necessity of being just, not by praising justice itself, but the good repute with mankind that accrues from it, the object that they hold before us being that by seeming to be just the man may get from the reputation office and alliances and all the good things that Glaucon just now enumerated as coming to the unjust man from his good name." 86 To read Polonius' s advice to Laertes with Plato' s eye is to sense the underlying note of calculation, especially where friends are concerned.
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern seem to present a sterner test of ordinariness, in that we are virtually invited to applaud their demise. Hamlet' s assertion-"They are not near my conscience" (F 5.2.58)-challenges not just Horatio but also the audience. Prosser blames Hamlet for ruthlessness because he could not be sure that his old friends had understood the full meaning of their visit to England. 87 Kott doesn't mention them specifically but we can guess what he might have said from his attitude to Ophelia, who has to be sacrificed as "part of the mechanism." 88 In the end, "indifferent children of the earth" (F 2.2.225) sounds right: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are the flawed progeny of Adam and citizens of the Cainite "city of the world." Like Gertrude, they are portrayed with tact. There are no signatures of evil, no villainous asides or confidences; they are simply on the make. Stoppard was within the bounds of plausibility to imagine them as victims, rather than as accomplices. The manner of their disposal should trouble us. If people like this are to be killed, then where does the killing stop?
Even the burial plots of Elsinore are crooked. Why does the skull thrown from the grave by the sexton' s shovel remind Hamlet of "Cain' s jawbone, that did the first murder" (F 5.1.77)? In tradition, if not in Genesis 4, Cain wields the jawbone of an ass to murder Abel. Here, the jawbone is Cain' s own. But that too-the wordplay seems to insist-is an effective weapon. If Cain' s hypocrisy and his role in founding "the city of the world" are borne in mind, there is a real connection between "Cain' s jawbone" and the former Cains imagined by Hamlet. Each portrait in this rogue' s gallery is linked by the idea of devious speech. Like Calvin' s hypocrite, the politician was "one that could circumvent God" (F 5.1.79). The courtier praised a horse "when he meant to beg it" (F 5.1.83-84). The lawyer had "quiddits" and "quillets, " "cases . . . tenures and . . . tricks" (F 5.1. [97] [98] . The "great buyer of land" had "his statutes, his recognizances, his fines, his double vouchers, his recoveries" and "conveyances of his lands" (F 5.1. 108) . Such purchasing might resonate with the inscrutable "election" by which Claudius acceded to the throne. In both cases, the suggestion is of a shady normality-"the corrupted currents of this world" (F 3.3.57)-processes that are crooked but legal.
It is just this image of evil that haunts Hamlet. The "unworthy" scorners of "patient merit" (F 3.1.74) and those who wield the "insolence of office" (F 3.1.73) anticipate the rogue' s gallery of the graveyard, down to the fine lady whose "inch thick" painting (F 5.1.189) allies her with Claudius' s "most painted word" (F 3.1.53). Whenever Hamlet generalizes from his immediate dilemma, his mind slips into the thought of normal injustice, oppressiveness, and corruption. Revenge is no answer to this, unless in the witty touch where Cain' s skull is jowled to the earth by the gravedigger, one of those who "hold up Adam' s profession" (F 5.1.31). This may be a joke on Calvin, whose commentary pointedly prefers the earthy occupations of the Adamites to the sophisticated occupations of the Cainites (a primitivism mocked in Luther' s commentary). Alternatively, the joke about Adam' s "arms" ("Why, he had none" [F 5.1.34]) gestures toward the medieval anthem of peasant egalitarianism, "Whan Adam dalf, and Eve span, / Wo was thane a gentilman?" 89 
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What must Hamlet do, mired in sin and dedicated to revenge? My proposition here is that the Reformation is as much a part of the solution as the problem. Linked by the Cain-Claudius symbolism, the themes of original sin and revenge mutually compound the Catch-22 character native to each. Where a heightened consciousness of original sin provokes ethical horror, it also demoralizes because one can do nothing to redress what one loathes in others, given that one is loathsome oneself. Obsession with original sin is a trap from which Hamlet can escape only by a leap of faith. The revenge dilemma is equally traplike: Hamlet must restore justice by destroying Claudius but do so in a way that does not taint his mind or involve his mother. Initially, the Ghost' s revelations seem to offer a way out of the oppressiveness of "sallied flesh" (Q2 1.2.129), because at last Hamlet has what Paul Ricoeur calls a "myth of accusation." 90 Claudius is now criminal, as well as merely loathsome. Yet the respite is illusory. The only evidence against Claudius is the Ghost' s testimony, and even Hamlet will not take the Ghost at his word. 91 Finally, although Hamlet establishes Claudius' s guilt to his own satisfaction, this still does not amount to proof. Claudius has covered his public tracks so well that he is vulnerable only to a secret revenge, which is to say, the tactic of Gyges and the trap of original sin.
For the most part, Hamlet pursues a rational, moral, and courageous course. To be sure, he lapses into moral hysteria, Senecan bloodthirstiness, and the mood of the "To be or not to be" soliloquy (F 3.1.56-88), momentarily taking up residence with Schopenhauer in what Lukacs called the "Grand Hotel Abyss." 92 But Hamlet is purposeful, too, establishing Claudius' s guilt to the point of certainty. The gains are rarely lasting. Thus, the success of the Mousetrap leads to one of Hamlet' s worst moments-his vengeful gloating over the praying Claudius-and a catastrophic error-the stabbing of Polonius. Yet within the limits of his mental, moral, and physical strength, Hamlet pursues the challenge of what he must do. He never gives in to the enemy and does not give way to despair.
The most productive response to both dilemmas is Hamlet' s dialogue with conscience: can he-in conscience-resist tyranny to the death? Can he rid himself of spies like Rosencrantz and Guildenstern? Should he address a wider spectrum of injustice (the scorning of "patient merit" and so on)? Can he just do away with himself? What exactly is conscience anyway? Must it be reactive or can it be proactive? Must it be monitory or can it be muscular? In posing these questions, Hamlet engages most fully with Reformed-especially Calvinistthinking, because it is here that the proactive dimension of conscience is most adventurously evolved.
Conscience is encountered first in its cowardly form: "Thus conscience does make cowards of us all" (F 3.1.83). The great soliloquy raises options-"to take arms . . . against a sea of troubles" (F 3.1.59) or commit suicide-but it discourages both. The legitimate course is cowardly. Hamlet echoes the Elizabethan Homilies and Reformed commentary on Paul' s epistle to the Romans, among other contexts. 93 The homilies against Disobedience and Wilful Rebellion make it clear that our sinfulness forfeits any expectation of just treatment in this world. 94 Unjust magistrates are to be endured, just as spectacularly evil rulers like Saul, Tiberius, and Nero were endured by David, Jesus, and St. Paul. 95 Calvin enjoins us to "suffer iniuries" with "a quiet minde," trusting to providence to vindicate innocence. 96 Against Romans 13:5, preaching obedience "not for fear of vengeance only: but also because of conscience," Tyndale adds the marginal comment: "Though thou were of power to resist the power, yet were thou damned in thy conscience if thou didest it, because it is against God' s commandment." 97 The equivalent gloss in the Geneva Bible largely concurs: "We must obey the Magistrate, not onely for fear of punishment, but much more because that (although the Magistrate hath no power over the conscience of man, yet seeing he is Gods minister) he cannot be resisted by any good conscience." 98 In the Homilies, however, to endure out of prudence rather than conscience is still preferable to the alternative of rebellion. The title page of An Homilie against Disobedience and Wylful Rebellion, published separately in 1570, juxtaposes "Iusticia" (whose right hand holds a sword) with "Prudencia" (holding a serpent writhed about her left arm). 99 Hamlet next invokes conscience in the Fortinbras soliloquy (Q2 4.4.31-65). But whether one should seek greatness honorably or rightly is left open. For all his reservations about Fortinbras' s recklessness and ruthlessness, Hamlet clearly envies him. The next invocation of conscience-Hamlet' s boast that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are "not near my conscience"-we have partly examined. What we can note, however, is the surprising turn taken by the theme. Where conscience has previously (if reluctantly) been deferred to, it is now conscripted aggressively to the dispatching of Hamlet' s old schoolfellows over Horatio' s implicit demur: "So Guildensterne and Rosincrance go to't" (F 5.2.56).
The final invocation of conscience is a true crux, crucial to our reading of the outcome and deeply ambiguous. Rehearsing a catalogue of Claudius' s villainies to Horatio, Hamlet rhetorically if somewhat obscurely asks in Q2: "Does it not, think thee, stand me now upon? / He that hath killed my King . . . / Is't not perfect conscience?" (Q2 5.2. [62] [63] 66 The difference in the texts is critical. In Q2, the rhetorical question is unambiguous for all its obscurity; in F, the added precision entangles itself in an implicit refutation. Hamlet wants to say that it is damnable to let a criminal remain on the throne, but his identification of the king with "this canker of our nature" that must not be allowed to "come / In further evil" resonates powerfully with the "canker" motif threading through the play. This includes Claudius' s invocation of the same motif shortly before to describe Hamlet himself ("But to the quick of th'ulcer-/ Hamlet comes back" [Q2 4.7.121-22]). With this parallel, Hamlet' s invocation embraces his own canker or innate sin. Hence, the proposition virtually disables itself. Since the "canker" passage appears in the later and normally terser F, rather than Q2, 100 it would seem to represent the definitive form in which the question is put. Without the additional material in F as disclaimer, the provocativeness of Hamlet' s question to Horatio is too great. Hamlet could easily be understood as inciting Horatio (and thus the audience) to "wylful rebellion." Characteristically, Horatio answers noncommitally ("Why, what a king is this!" [5.2.62]). 101 Neither toady nor conspirator, Horatio walks a fine line. His exemplary judiciousness-"e' en as just a man / As e' er my conversation coped withal" (F 3.2.52-53)-demands no less. tant believer. We find ourselves hoist on the same petard-that of a faux Protestant piety-feared by Bradley, Sinfield, and Edwards. How is it credible that Hamlet should suddenly reach for the patently Calvinist category of "special providence" or Q1' s "Predestiuate providence" (Q1 2.126)? It is tempting to say that what separates these two moments is an unseen leap of faith. Equally, the Osric interlude may signal Hamlet' s change of mind. The interlude, present in some form in all three texts (Q2 5.2.68-162), presents a difficulty equivalent to that of the Lamord passage; its length and elaborateness (particularly in Q2) are not justified by its functionality. Part of the reason for this impression is a failure to appreciate its resonance with the Lamord passage. Osric is a kind of double to Laertes in his devotion to fencing, his courtliness, and his use of technical language (the term "carriages" [F 5.2.116-18], for example, which Hamlet professes not to understand). Osric positively embodies the courtly enthusiasm infusing Claudius' s account of Lamord. Laertes in turn is linked to Lamord, both as an admirer (calling him "the brooch, indeed, / And gem of all our nation" [F 4.3.78-79]) and as the reported object of Lamord' s own admiration (F 4.3.80-88). As Lamord is to horsemanship, so Laertes is to fencing. What Hamlet so disdains in Osric is not just his idiocy but the courtly emulation that he represents, the ethic of which Hamlet himself (according to Ophelia [F 3.1.151-61]) was once a conspicuous example. Revenge is equally part of this courtly ethic. Honor must be satisfied at all costs. The Osric episode is relevant to Hamlet' s change of mind and equally relevant to the abrupt contrast posed by the Calvinist "special providence" to which Hamlet now submits himself.
The result that Hamlet awaits at the hands of Providence is undeniably ominous. What "will come" (F 5.2.170) is heavy with the dread Hamlet already feels at conceding the initiative to Claudius: "Thou wouldst not think how ill all' s here about my heart" (Q2 5.2.190-91). In these circumstances, blind faith is surely fatal, as Hamlet knows. Yet it must also be said that the event proves Hamlet' s strategy to have been right, if the crucial issue is to end the Catch-22 situation whereby Claudius cannot be brought to justice. In her last moments, Gertrude makes her first and only moral decision by unmasking Claudius and putting an end to his public immunity. It is as if Gyges' s ring had been snatched away from him. Laertes seconds her accusation. Claudius now stands naked not just before Hamlet but also before the shadowy collective that elected him king. Although a cry of "Treason, treason!" is raised by "All," as the First Folio puts it (F 5.2.277n), no one steps forward in Claudius' s defense: "O yet defend me, friends. I am but hurt" (F 5.2.278). In principle, the violence of the conclusion can be seen as lawful, rather than impulsive (as Adorno thought) or vengeful (as most leveling critics suppose). 111 It is possible
